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Question 
What approaches have been effective in promoting intra-regional trade in staple foods in sub-
Saharan Africa? A particular concern is reducing government interference in markets for staple 
crops.  
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Overview 
Intra-regional trade in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is significantly lower than its potential.  This is 
particularly true for key staple foods, which are important for development and the alleviation of 
poverty. The missed opportunities for the development of private sector and specifically staple 
food cross-border trade are due to the existence of numerous trade barriers, which vary across 
countries and evolve rapidly, sometimes unpredictably, with time. Policy makers are aware of the 
existence of these barriers, some of which are gender-specific. The majority of current policies 
are oriented towards regional liberalisation and integration; however, their implementation on the 
ground is slow and inconsistent. The key issues concern the predictability of trade policies and 
the de facto implementation of agreements. The most successful initiatives combine 
(i) consultation with and commitment from a large variety of actors, including government 
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officials, civil society, small businesses, and often including external partnerships; (ii) investment 
in infrastructure and facilitation of the business environment; and (iii) improvement of 
relationships between officials and tradespeople. 
Regional trade is crucial for development of SSA countries.  SSA’s agricultural resources are not 
allocated equally across or within countries; the region has traditional areas of food deficit and 
food surplus which are artificially demarcated by national borders. On average, the demand for 
staple goods is much higher than its supply in the SSA region. Given population growth and 
increased urbanisation, Africa’s demand for food staples will continue to increase: hence a need 
to increase farmers’ contributions to meet regional demand (World Bank, 2012). An approach to 
food security based on national self-sufficiency cannot work. 
However, only a few SSA countries actively participate in intra-regional trade by exporting staple 
goods to other SAA countries; the largest share of staple foods comes from outside the region. 
Particularly for staple foods, regional trade is underdeveloped: only 5% of SSA’s imports of 
cereals come from other SSA countries (World Bank, 2012). Because of volatility in the price of 
staples in many SSA countries (especially in land-locked countries), governments empower 
agencies to intervene in agricultural markets to stabilise prices. These interventions discourage 
intra-regional trade in many cases (World Bank, 2012). 
Despite commitments (e.g. regional integration arrangements and regional trade agreements) to 
opening up regional trade in food, implementation has generally been weak and governments 
continue to restrict trade by maintaining tariff and non-tariff barriers and other constraints. The 
persistence of barriers to food trade in SSA can be also explained by a lack of credible 
commitment between the government and private sector, the disproportionately strong role of 
anti-reform lobby groups and the difficulties farmers encounter in engaging in collective action 
(Engel et al., 2013). Nonetheless, the overall current trend is oriented towards regional 
integration and development of the private sector in the staple food market.  
There is a consensus in the literature reviewed for this report that while trade liberalisation is not 
a panacea, intra-regional trade in SSA should be facilitated. This can be done in partnership with 
private sector by supporting staple food trade chains.  Disseminating information, training cross-
border traders, and reducing government interference in price formation are key 
recommendations in the literature. Numerous trade-promotion initiatives take place on different 
levels, some targeting small-scale cross border trade and often facilitating, promoting and 
developing informal trading by women as key ingredients of success. 
A large majority of the initiatives identified in this research are supported by international 
organisations and development agencies in partnership with the private sector. These initiatives 
facilitate trade by addressing the physical needs of traders, implementing more automated and 
clear processes, and improving the general regulatory environment. Several initiatives are 
specific to particular sectors or needs, such as transport initiatives, women-focused initiatives, 
phytosanitary requirements, and improvement of border posts.  
In addition to the usual difficulties of accessing reliable information on informal activities (which 
play a large role in cross-border trade) and the difficulty of interpreting case studies as being 
representative of a very heterogeneous region, this review has the following explicit limitations:  
• The lack of consideration of the exchange rates and monetary policies of SSA countries. 
The existence of multiple currencies is not facilitating the cross-border and regional trade; 
engendering transaction costs and adding to the volatility element.  
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• The lack of consideration of the impact of the limited access to finance, particularly for 
female traders.  
• The “success bias”, when successful initiatives are (at least partially) reported and 
possibly exaggerated, but the failed ones are omitted from the literature: this does not 
allow for a comprehensive analysis of key characteristics.  
• The scope of the review does not permit a detailed investigation of selected successful 
initiatives; sometimes documents internal to the international organisations are not 
readily available.  
1. Intra-regional trade in staple foods in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) 
Significant intra-regional trade opportunities in SSA countries remain unexploited, especially in 
agriculture. This may be explained by several factors:  
• A mismatch in staple trade between the supply side (i.e. what SSA countries produce) 
and the demand side (i.e. what they consume);  
• A lack of infrastructure and transport facilities and a continued dependence on traditional 
trade partners (UNCTAD, 2013); 
• Trade barriers, including institutional and political barriers.  
Existing trade patterns 
Intra-regional trade in sub-Saharan Africa remains consistently low compared with 
intercontinental trade (Economic Commission for Africa, 2010). Continent-wide, more than 80 
percent of Africa’s exports are destined for outside markets, with the European Union (EU) and 
the United States accounting for more than 50 percent of this total.  
Analysing trade flows within SSA is quite challenging since a non-negligible amount of trade 
occurs informally and therefore is not recorded in the usual databases, and when it is recorded, 
data are often incomplete and inconsistent.  For instance, Josserand (2013) has found that 
official trade statistics of staple foods probably capture on average only about one-third of actual 
transactions by value.  
The growth in volume of SSA intra-regional food trade progresses more slowly than trade outside 
the continent (Chauvin et al., 2012). The majority of intra-regional trade in basic/most used goods 
(but also in other goods) occurs in simple informal cross-border deals that often involve female 
traders traveling from one country to another to buy goods to sell in market stalls. These 
movements include simple cross-border transactions between extended family and tribe 
members as well as transactions along traditional corridors that sometimes extend over 
thousands of kilometres and multiple border posts (Keyser, 2012). Staple goods traded via 
informal channels vary from very small quantities moved by bicycle to large volumes trucked over 
long distances. 
Larger-scale informal trade routes can be observed from surplus food zones into deficit food 
areas. For instance, with just 9.3 percent of total land classified as arable, Kenya suffers from a 
structural deficit in staple food (mostly in maize) and relies in most years on informal imports from 
Uganda and Tanzania. Southern Malawi is another example of a chronically deficient food zone 
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that depends in most years on maize from northern Mozambique and eastern Zambia (Keyser, 
2012). 
According to the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group (FSNWG)1 the total volume of 
informal trade between 11 eastern Africa countries, maize grain was the most informally traded 
commodity in Eastern Africa (from July 2016 to June 2017 approximately 339,000 metric tons 
(MT) of maize is sold through informal channels), following by rice (about 127,000 MT), sorghum 
(110,000 MT) and dry beans (107,000 MT). In the fourth quarter of 2016 maize grain represented 
31 percent of informally traded commodity in Eastern Africa, followed by rice (19 percent), wheat 
and flour (14 percent), dry beans (12 percent), sorghum (9 percent), sugar (8 percent), sesame 
seeds (7 percent), (FSNWG, 2017). 
Regional cooperation  
There is much support from SSA governments for regional integration. Since independence, they 
have embraced regional integration as an important component of their development strategies 
(Hartzenberg, 2011) and have concluded many regional integration arrangements (RIAs) and 
regional trade agreements (RTAs).  
At a larger scale, multiple regional blocs, so-called Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
were created. These are primarily trade blocs (including in some cases political and military 
cooperation), several of which have significant membership overlap. The major RECs in SSA: 
• the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); 
• the East African Community (EAC); 
• the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); 
• the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); 
• the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); 
• the Southern African Development Community (SADC); 
• the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)  
Pointing towards a desire for even broader integration, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 (AU, 
2017a) describes a 50-year development plan featuring a focus on African integration including 
freedom of movement of people, capital, and goods (point 24, Agenda 2063, 2015). This 
ambition is supported by the desire to develop transportation and communication infrastructure to 
facilitate both economic and political integration of the continent (point 25, Agenda 2063, 2015). 
One of the flagship initiatives of the AU is the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), (AU, 2017a). 
The second meeting of the technical working group took place in April 2017 and the draft is 
scheduled to be proposed soon (AU, 2017b).  
The large number of regional trade blocs in SSA suggests that policymakers believe that trade 
blocs present opportunities for promoting regional trade, boosting growth, engendering 
development and overcome food security problem (UNCTAD, 2013). However, even if de jure 
both trade and agricultural policy are becoming regionalised, there is still significant variation in 
                                                 
1 The FSNWG monitors informal cross-border trade of 88 food commodities and livestock in eastern Africa (i.e. 
Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan and DRC). 
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terms of the pace of integration and harmonisation across the SSA countries, as well as the 
extent to which private sector actors are incorporated into these processes (Engel et al., 2013).  
2. Barriers to food trade in sub-Saharan Africa  
Despite expressing an ambition for liberalised trade and steady progress in the de jure 
liberalisation of staple food markets, governments in SSA countries continue to intervene heavily 
into markets. These interventions may take different forms, e.g. import tariffs (or other legal 
barriers to trade) or manipulation of the prices of staple goods (i.e. selling public reserves of food 
staples at below-market prices), and are usually presented as “national food security 
interventions” (see among others Dorosh et al., 2009).  
Limited empirical research has been conducted into the price volatility of staple food in SSA, and 
the effects of liberalisation remain debated (Poulton et al., 2006). Seasonal and yearly (rainfall 
dependent) variability of prices, which negatively affect the poorest populations most, are used to 
justify government intervention to stabilise prices. However, for example, statistical analysis by 
Minot (2011) finds that the world price of maize has been less volatile than the price of maize in 
Africa, suggesting that strategies of national food self-sufficiency have not been effective in 
reducing food price volatility and may even have exacerbated the problem. 
Furthermore, according to the World Bank (2012), in most cases these interventions usually have 
an adverse impact on the regional market for food staples, especially when prices are artificially 
manipulated and inconsistent with world market prices. Such policies create uncertainty and 
unpredictability on these markets and, thus, diminish the productivity and trading capacities of 
domestic farmers and private firms and raise fears of being undercut by subsidised government 
food (World Bank, 2012).  
The key barriers to staple food trade include: 
• Official tariff and non-tariff barriers; 
• Restricted and limited access to inputs such as seeds and fertilisers; 
• Outdated, opaque and unpredictable trade policies; 
• Corruption; 
• High transportation costs; 
• Significant informal trade and gender barriers to trade.  
Intra-SSA trade faces high tariffs and significant non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as: product 
standards; price controls; discriminatory foreign exchange allocation; quotas or prohibitions; non-
automatic licensing; administrative obstacles; excessive and unnecessary document 
requirements; and unnecessary delays in custom and other official procedures (see also Mbithi 
et al., 2016). 
The effect of NTBs on trade is hard to quantify, but combined with tariffs, they increase trade 
costs and inhibit intra-regional trade in staple crops2. There are also some concerns that the 
reduction of tariff barriers in SSA may make the use of NTBs more common and pervasive as 
                                                 
2 Successful regional integration experiences elsewhere in the world highlight that tackling tariff barriers is 
necessary but not sufficient to enhance trade (Engel and Jouanjean, 2013). 
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SSA countries continue to rely on a “self-sufficiency model” and seek to protect their markets 
from external competition (Keane et al., 2010). 
NTBs are applied not only to small traders, but also to big ones. For instance, the largest 
purchaser of food in West Africa, the World Food Programme, has reported frequent problems in 
obtaining export permits, quality certificates and other documents from different countries in 
order to process transactions (Keyser, 2012). 
Although SSA RECs have signed many trade agreements on the removal of tariffs and NTBs, 
very little progress has been made in implementation of these agreements; this fact continues to 
hamper SSA intra-regional trade (UNCTAD, 2013). 
The cross-border seeds trade is restricted primarily due to NTBs, resulting from sanitary, 
phytosanitary and plant quarantine measures, seed certification, and variety release regulations, 
which differ across countries. “Seeds security” measures are part of the national “food security” 
approach existing in SSA countries. These restrictions have a significant impact as many SSA 
farmers lack access to modern high-yield seed varieties (World Bank, 2012). Food safety and 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) rules and regulations for food staples vary across 
SSA countries despite many having similar agro-ecological conditions for pests and diseases, 
and similar demands on food safety3 (World Bank, 2012). Food quality standards also differ 
among SSA countries and negatively affect regional trade in SSA food staples, mainly because 
of opacity of national trade policies (e.g. when traders are unaware of the destination country’s 
standards and only learn of them at the port of entry)4. A key concern with seed regulation in 
SSA is the inordinate amount of time required for the approval process, which can take two to 
three years or longer (World Bank, 2012). 
Similarly, fertilisers cannot move freely from one country to another in SSA. Most fertiliser 
consumed is imported from outside the continent and almost all of the phosphate rock and 
fertilisers produced in SSA are exported out of the continent (FTF, 2015). According to the U.S. 
Government’s ‘Feed the Future’ initiative (2015), challenges and policies that restrain the SSA 
fertiliser market are mostly associated with government interventions in the form of taxes, tariffs, 
subsidy programs, and poor infrastructure5. For instance, approximately one-third of countries 
have import duties and half the countries levy some form of tax on fertilisers in SSA (Wanzala, 
2011). 
Another significant barrier to cross-border trade (in all types of goods) is corruption. The 
consequences of corruption can be seen on the macroeconomic or political level (e.g. elections 
in 2016), but also on a local level, crucial for small businesses (Transparency International, 
2017). Despite being a model for stability in the region, the corruption index of Ghana, (as well as 
of Malawi, Lesotho, and Gambia) has significantly declined. Some other large SSA countries, 
such as South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya, have also failed to improve their scores on 
the index. Corruption may affect cross-border traders directly (e.g. bribes at border posts) or 
through restrictive trade policies implemented at the instance of lobby groups.  
                                                 
3 Farmers in one country may not have access to higher yield seeds that have been approved by the 
neighbouring country under similar agro-climatic conditions. 
4 These costs and delays are quite often intensified by border customs officials who do not understand seed 
trade policy (World Bank, 2012). 
5 For more details, please see FTF (2015), p. 10. 
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The SSA region is characterised by poor, underdeveloped and inefficient transportation 
infrastructure, poor national, regional and international connectivity6 and ineffective logistical 
services (Viljoen, 2016). The cost of moving goods in SSA is high, transit times uncertain, and 
delays exceptionally long. According to UNCTAD (2016b), transport costs in Africa are the 
highest in the world7. SSA’s high transport prices are accompanied by poor service quality, on 
average below other regions in the world (Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2009). The World 
Bank’s Logistics Performance Index 2016 rates SSA lower than any other region worldwide, 
indicating that a large part of the continent does not provide sufficient affordable and reliable 
transport and logistics service (World Bank, 2016). According to the World Bank (2012), high 
transportation costs are due to a lack of competition in transport (trucking) sector, little incentive 
to modernise, and a large number of cross-border restrictions. One of the more obvious but 
stubbornly persistent problems is that of roadblocks8 which cause delays and offer opportunities 
for bribe seekers (World Bank 2012).  
African women are often considered to be “at the forefront” or “key actors” of intra-Africa trading 
activities (see for example World Bank, 2013). The World Bank report (Brenton et al., 2013) 
demonstrates that the majority of small cross-border trade is performed by women, informally, 
and in large part trading staple foods; another study reports that 70 to 80 percent of informal 
cross-border traders are women, and that their activity is centred on staple foods (TMEA, 2017b). 
SSA female cross-border traders face the following gender barriers (Brenton et al., 2013): 
• gender biased treatment at cross-border posts (ranging from bribes to insults and 
physical harassment); 
• lack of awareness of their rights (exacerbated by difference in social classes between 
poor female traders and older, more literate officials); 
• lack of “business culture” for women (lack of decision-making power within the household 
and related private property rights issues, as well as the fact that they are often denied 
participation in trade networks and high value activities); 
• from a formal perspective, women face more constraints and delays in acquiring 
necessary documents. 
Brenton et al. (2013) recommend changes to both households’ and officials’ behaviours to lift 
these constraints. They strongly call for transparency and gender equality, among others, at the 
border crossing posts. One-stop border posts (OSBP), described in section 3, are an attempt to 
implement these recommendations. Given that many female traders are not formally registered 
as businesses, the formalisation of these small-scale trade activities would both benefit female 
empowerment and boost economic activity (FAO, 2017). 
3. Policy recommendations from various authorities 
Many of the above barriers are not exclusive to staple foods. Thus, while some trade 
liberalisation and cross-border trade facilitation initiatives are not explicitly aimed at the staple 
                                                 
6 Landlocked countries are in a particularly difficult situation.  
7 African countries paid more for international transport than any other region over 2005-2014 period (i.e. an 
average of 11.4 percent of the final cost against only 6.8 percent for developed countries 
8 Even if individual delays and number of bribes made at each roadblock are relatively small, a large number of 
roadblocks over short distances usually add up to significant expense and delay, raising transport costs and 
leading to inefficient use of transport equipment and drivers’ work-time. 
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foods market, they will nevertheless significantly affect agricultural products. The key specific 
barriers to intra-regional trade in staple foods are national trade policies. Policy 
recommendations and examples of initiatives to address this and some other issues are 
presented below.  
Poulton et al. (2006) offer recommendations to reduce staple food price volatility. One 
recommendation is to encourage the development of private grain storage facilities. This can be 
done through subsidies, but the authors warn against using this method in the long term and 
advocate the setting of clear rules, including the protection of property rights, to minimise the 
crowding-out effect9. Kirimi et al., (2011) and Enzama, (2016) suggest that the development and 
the use of private storage facilities is restricted by uncertainties in prices of the stored food 
products. For example, concerning the storage of maize in Kenya, unexpected changes in import 
tariff rates and in National Cereals and Produce Board selling prices cause significant price 
volatility and may render the storage facilities unprofitable. Stabilising government behaviour 
should improve the development of the private storage facilities.  
Another recommendation is to adopt a policy of “critical commodity chain support”, where support 
(e.g. access to financing and transport infrastructure) is aimed at small local producers of staple 
foods, fostering the development of the private sector in production. This approach was adopted 
in Kenya for maize production, where evidence shows that marketing training offered by the 
Kenya Maize Development Programme enables farmers allowing them to obtain higher prices 
(Kirimi et al., 2011). However, the overall effectiveness of this approach is hard to evaluate, as in 
2016 Kenya was only net importing maize and the results of support to the local producers and 
traders are therefore not apparent (Enzama, 2016).  
Dorosh et al. (2009) suggest that trade should be the stabilising tool: the authors give the 
example of Zambia, which depending on the harvest, can be a net exporter or net importer of 
maize. Cross-border trade of maize and cassava is heavily discouraged by unpredictable policies 
and general mistrust: producers know that the government is likely to regulate the prices in both 
abundant and deficient years, reducing the investment incentives (Dorosh et al., 2009).  
Subsidy programmes and food aid may provide temporary relief, but are not sustainable in the 
long term and discourage private production. Dorosh et al. (2009) provide a theoretical model 
adapted to the case of Zambia and maize trade with South Africa. The authors examine a wide 
range of policy instruments and conclude that in the event of an exogenous shock (for example a 
bumper harvest or a drought) an open border policy will be the most beneficial in the long run, 
especially for the poorest households. On the contrary, authors demonstrate that quotas and 
price regulations exacerbate the volatility of prices, and reduce the motivation to explore other 
cultivars (for example drought-resistant ones) and to invest in agricultural innovations. Thus, 
while acknowledging that full scale liberalisation cannot be a panacea, there is sufficient 
evidence to recommend regional trade facilitation. Lesser & Moisé-Leeman (2009) obtain similar 
results for a generalised analysis of SSA countries. The authors give additional 
recommendations for facilitating dialogue between small cross-border traders and officials. They 
also warn that trade policy reform will not have an immediate impact and will not fully eliminate 
the informal trade in the region.  
                                                 
9 The crowding-out effect occurs when increased government intervention, for example increased government 
spending on producing staple foods by the public organisations, would replace the production of the private 
sector.  
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Such general policy recommendations become closer to practice: available case studies illustrate 
a shift in trade policy perspective for many SSA countries from restrictive government 
intervention with “food security” as the stated goal to promotion and development of the private 
sector. In trade and agricultural policies this was done via a number of Public-Private Partnership 
initiatives (PPPs). It has to be noted that trade policies are very heterogeneous across different 
countries, and they may evolve rapidly depending on the political situation. Many countries 
declare the importance of regional trade integration policies, but others continue to attempt to 
rely on a “self-sufficiency” model, adopting protectionist measures and restricting staple foods 
markets.  
4. Examples of initiatives for trade promotion and 
facilitation  
Eastern Africa Seed Committee (EASCOM) 
EASCOM exemplifies a PPP that has evolved to address the gaps in policy and practice 
regarding production and trade in seed across ten countries in eastern and central Africa. This 
committee is comprised of breeders, regulators, policymakers and public-sector representatives 
from each member country (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda).  
The EASCOM platform facilitates the adoption and implementation of harmonised regional seed 
regulations, standards and procedures that were agreed in 2002. This has led to advances in 
variety evaluation, release and registration, seed certification, phytosanitary management, plant 
variety protection, and seed import and export procedures in Eastern and Central Africa.  
Seed policy harmonisation in ECA has contributed to growth in private-sector involvement in the 
sector and more varieties being bred and released by the private sector. The gains from 
harmonisation include: 
• Kenya has released 140 new crop varieties, 30% from the private sector10; 
• Uganda released 27 varieties, 50% from the private sector; 
• Tanzania released 121 varieties, 30% from the private sector; 
• Sudan released 243 varieties, all from the public sector; 
The total welfare gain for the ECA region as a result of this initiative has been estimated to be 
over US$727 million (CTA, 2015). 
Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(ACTESA) 
In 2010, in an effort to boost regional trade in agricultural commodities, the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Heads of State and Government established the 
Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa (ACTESA), as a Specialised 
                                                 
10 During 2000-2008, 14 seed enterprises released 140 varieties in Kenya, representing a growth rate of 270 
percent over the 38 varieties released 1981-1999. Of these, 43 varieties were from privately owned seed 
companies (Waithaka et al., 2012). 
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Agency of COMESA to integrate small-scale farmers into national, regional and international 
markets (COMESA, 2015). 
ACTESA’s objectives are to: 
• improve competitiveness and integration of staple foods markets in the region through 
improved micro and macro-economic policies as the drivers of staple food markets; 
• improve and expand market facilities and services for key agricultural commodities; 
• increase the commercial integration of smallholder farmers into national and regional 
market.  
According to a USAID (2012) evaluation, ACTESA needed improvement in management and 
governance, as well as financial viability. The latest published report on the COMESA official 
web-site for 2015 shows a very timid increase in the regional trade and underlines the continuing 
inconsistencies in tariff rates between the member of the Alliance, as well as difficulties in the 
implementation of agreements. This concerned particularly cross-border trade, where traders 
were not aware of their rights and applicable tariffs (COMESA, 2016). The Cassava Cluster 
Programme is among the few reporting positive results, with clusters established and selling their 
produce to industries in Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda, and Kenya (in the latter a gendered approach 
is ensured by the partnership with the Federation of National Associations of Women in Business 
in Eastern and Southern Africa) (COMESA, 2014).  
Food trade remains a major challenge: the region continues to be a net importer and the 
commitments previously undertaken to promote intra-regional trade and agriculture were not 
respected. New initiatives were established: the Comprehensive African Agricultural 
Development Programme (CAADP) in particular should authorise further development of the 
Public-Private Dialogue Platform. The first events in this programme took place only in the 
beginning of 2017 (CBC, 2017), thus it is likely to be too early for any evaluation of results.  
With the “Trading for Peace” programme COMESA established and funded trade information 
desks (TID) (for example, at key border posts between Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; Rwanda 
and Uganda) (AfBD, 2013; ATF, 2015). Such facilities make customs procedures more user-
friendly with a TID officer to assist traders in completing documents. Due to cessation of funding 
by COMESA, since 2015 TIDs have been used as foundation for the Great Lakes Trade 
Facilitation project established by World Bank. TID officers should be able to help cross-border 
trade by providing information, including the COMESA Simplified Trade Regime; and by taking 
complaints and mediating conflicts. The latest report on results (World Bank, 2017b) shows that 
targets are far from being achieved.  
East Africa Trade and Investment Hub (EATIH) 
The East Africa Trade and Investment Hub (2014-2019) is an on-going U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) funded project, managed by Development Alternatives 
Incorporated (DAI). It aims to increase trade and investment in the region (among Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) and, therefore, to reinforce regional integration. One of 
the main objectives is to bolster regional trade in staple foods, i.e. to increase the EAC’s intra-
regional trade in staple foods by 40 percent (USAID, 2015).  
The EATIH works with regional public and private sector partners; the EATIH’s partners include 
regional economic communities (RECs) and regional trade associations (RTAs).   
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According to USAID (2014), some progress has been made in Harmonisation of Standards for 
Staple Foods. The EATIH has “facilitated extensive consultations between the EAC, COMESA 
and the Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa (ACTESA), national level 
bureaus of standards and the private sector to harmonise standards for 22 staple foods including 
maize, wheat, rice, beans, and millet” (USAID, 2014). 
Among other results, this project facilitated the Eastern Africa Grain Council Forum, where 58 
contracts were signed to sell 279,000 metric tons of Ethiopian food grain surplus to neighbouring 
East African countries with food shortages; the total value of these contracts was US$93 million 
(DAI, 2017). 
A similar initiative to reduce trade barriers in a different region, “Southern Africa – Trade and 
Investment Hub (SATIH)”, is also funded by USAID and managed by DAI.  
MoveAfrica 
MoveAfrica is a transport and logistics initiative of the NEPAD Agency that was officially 
launched in May 2016 on the margins of the World Economic Forum in Kigali, Rwanda. This 
initiative aims to address the transformation of Africa’s trade by addressing soft issues related to 
cross-border transport and logistics challenges on the continent. It will seek to reduce transport 
costs and increase logistical efficiency in Africa in order to boost intra-regional trade and 
economic development.  
This initiative targets the soft infrastructure in particular; to address the existing issues in laws 
governing cross-border transport, the regulations for crossing the border (e.g. customs 
clearance, quarantine), and the systems and organisational resources for the operation and 
maintenance of “hard” infrastructure will be implemented (NEPAD, 2016; TRALAC, 2016).  
Because this initiative was launched only last year, outcomes cannot yet be evaluated, but 
TRALAC (a capacity-building NGO operating in eastern and southern Africa) estimates that the 
volume of trade in SSA will more than triple, from 102.6 million tonnes in 2009 to 384 million 
tonnes by 2030, if trade corridors are completed (TRALAC, 2016). 
TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) 
TradeMark East Africa (TMEA), an organisation funded by multiple international development 
agencies is working closely with the East African Community to promote economic development 
through trade. TMEA finances a range of projects on different scales, with an emphasis on 
facilitating physical access to markets (TMEA, 2017a). These physical improvements are 
complemented by improvements in the trade environment: TMEA is participating in the 
construction and monitoring of one-stop border posts (OSBPs) in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Burundi and South Sudan (TMEA 2017b, c, and d).  
In Rwanda, the interventions funded by TMEA between 2010 and 2016, at a cost of $65 million 
and implemented in partnership with the Government of Rwanda, have contributed to:  
• Reduction in cost of transporting containers from Mombasa to Kigali from $6500 in 2011 
to $4800 in 2016 saving the country approximately $7 million; 
• Improvement of Rwanda’s ranking in trading across borders; i.e. ranking improved 44 
places (from 131 to 87), mostly as a result of investments made by TMEA, that have 
reduced the time taken to export and import and exit borders.  
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This was achieved by increased automation of key trade processes, reduction of NTBs, improved 
standards testing and border infrastructure upgrades in Rwanda. For example, from eight weigh-
bridges only one is remaining; roadblocks are reduced; a modern high-capacity bridge is 
constructed, parking facilities are made available; and an electronic single window at the 
customs was set (EUROPAID, 2017; RTDA, 2017; OECD, 2017a).  
One-stop border posts (OSBPs)  
One-stop border posts (OSBPs) provide a legal framework, facilities, and procedures to allow 
goods and people to cross borders in a single streamlined facility rather than stopping at 
separate exit and entry posts. They combine and simplify clearance procedures, reduce the 
number of administrative steps, increase coordination between different controls, and optimise 
the use of different facilities (e.g. computer and scanning facilities, office accommodation). 
OSBPs are “expected to reduce time and cost in crossing borders” (TMEA 2017a). They also 
increase transparency: information is more easily collected and monitored. Warehouse facilities 
are made available for small cross-border traders, who are also better able to coordinate their 
activities and access economies of scale (e.g. hiring one truck for several traders). Equality is 
improving overall, with public toilets, gender disaggregated detention centres, and special 
facilities for women with children and physically challenged traders (OECD, 2017b). Direct 
benefits to the private sector are already reported (TMEA, 2017b). OSBPs have been 
established between Kenya and Tanzania. TMEA and OECD (2017b) report the reduction of 
customs clearance time in Busia OSBP in Uganda (on the border with Kenya) and the reduction 
in the volume of customs declarations. There are further plans to establish OSBPs between 
Uganda and South Sudan. 
Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System (RECTS) 
The African Union’s Agenda 2063 has an ambitious aspiration for SSA infrastructure and a 
number of different projects are ongoing. One of the most recent initiatives is the Regional 
Electronic Cargo Tracking System (RECTS) between Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda unveiled in 
2017. This system should allow reduced transit time, cargo theft and diversion of goods in transit. 
Countries will seal loopholes that lead to revenue loss because of the diversion of un-taxed 
goods into the market. RECTS will also eliminate the need for physical escort and monitoring of 
sensitive cargo (TMEA, 2017d).  
Initiatives targeting gender bias and informal trade 
Through initiatives of African-specific networks, such as African Women’s Economic Policy 
Network (AWEPON), women have access to training and networks. The importance of gender 
barriers cannot be underestimated. Successful examples of female-owned and female-employing 
cereals companies (such as “ETS Tout Super” or “Rama Cereal”) trading at the national and 
regional levels, and achieved with the help of Trade Hub training programmes and access to 
finance facilitation are showcased by the USAID #EntrepreneuriElle online campaign (USAID, 
2017; West Africa Trade and Investment Hub, 2017a and 2017b).  
TMEA also trains women in cross-border trade regulations (reporting more than 2000 women 
trained) and brings together formal and informal actors through a project called “Search for the 
Common Ground” which aims to inform all participants of the EAC Customs Union protocols. 
This, in turn, should facilitate the implementation of the official initiatives, which otherwise remain 
unimplemented and have very little impact. Through all these (and other) networks, 
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dissemination of market information and policy consultations with small-scale cross-border 
traders is conducted relatively successfully in Uganda, Rwanda, Liberia, and Ghana (FAO, 
2017). 
The common passport for ECOWAS should also lower some of the barriers faced by female 
cross-border traders11, even if this initiative is still limited due to only partial implementation 
(UNECA, 2017). 
One of the most prominent recommendations is to reduce obstacles to formal trade. One such 
measure was the introduction of simplified trade regimes (STR), reducing customs procedures 
for relatively low volumes of goods traded. FAO (2017) identifies COMESA’s STRs as best 
practice to be disseminated to other SSA regions. The STR is operational between COMESA 
Members. It is used where a small scale cross border trader is exporting goods valued at 
US$1,000.00 or less per consignment. The goods should be listed on the COMESA STR 
Common List and should be for re-sale or use in the business. 
The STR is intended to overcome any challenges by simplifying the whole process of clearing 
goods for small scale cross border traders by way of: 
• A Simplified Certificate of Origin which should be signed and stamped by a national 
official at the border post for all goods that appear on the Common List. 
• A common list of qualifying goods displayed at all border posts within COMESA. 
• A simplified customs document completed as the trader enters the country he/she is 
exporting to (ZIMRA, 2017). 
The COMESA Green Pass (CGP)  
The COMESA Green Pass (CGP) will be a harmonised sanitary and phytosanitary regime with a 
regional certification scheme (GIZ, 2012). One of its objectives is to facilitate movement and 
trade in food and agricultural commodities by restoring confidence among trade partners and 
removing SPS barriers to trade. The Green Pass would be issued by a National Green Pass 
Authority that would certify, monitor and keep a database of certified companies. A SPS 
Certification Technical Panel (within the COMESA SPS Unit) would support and monitor the 
competent authorities accredited to issue CGPs. According to this scheme, if a product has been 
inspected and certified in conformity with SPS rules in a COMESA Member state, it can be then 
traded in other COSMESA countries without any additional inspections. 
The feasibility study for CGP (covering maize, beef, and fresh fruits) was completed in 2014 
(STDF, 2014). It seems that this initiative is still in a project form (COMESA, 2015) and we were 
unable to find any robust evaluations of its impacts. However, according to the World Bank 
(2012), efforts like the Green Pass, which encourage member states to recognise each other’s 
conformity assessment procedures, would reduce the transaction costs of export procedures and 
therefore boost regional trade in food staples. 
Addressing unpredictability and opacity of trade policies 
Opacity and unpredictability of trade policies are among the paramount obstacles to intra-
regional trade in general and particularly in trade in staple crops, since they usually provoke 
mistrust between government and the private sector. Predictability and commitment to existing 
                                                 
11 As female traders more often do not have passports or have more difficulties in obtaining them. 
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regulations and agreements, and better communication of government policies, are key 
environmental factors supporting the private sector, enabling agents to make better-informed 
long-term decisions, and to invest in modernisation. Economic operators should have clarity 
about import tariffs that they will be charged when they enter into contracts (Euro Commerce, 
2015). Uncertainty can even cause withdrawal of private firms from the market altogether 
(Tschirley et al. 2006). For instance, a study of Zambian maize markets showed that several 
international grain trading companies left the market because of high risks imposed by 
unpredictable government participation in the maize market (Nijhoff et al. 2002). 
Article X of the GATT (Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations) requires each WTO 
Member to: 1) publish its related laws, regulations, rulings and agreements in a prompt and 
accessible manner; 2) abstain from enforcing measures of general application prior to their 
publication; 3) administer the above-mentioned laws, regulations, ruling and agreements in a 
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner. The main objective of this article is transparency.  
However, many SSA countries continue to meet difficulties in fulfilling the notification obligations 
for transparency purposes (WTO, 2017b). In 2013, concerns over the length of the negotiation 
process and disappointment with very limited results were expressed in the conference of 
Ministers of Trade on Economic Partnership Agreement within the African Union framework (AU, 
2013). One example of the impact of unpredictable policies was recently illustrated by a trade 
dispute between Tanzania and Kenya in which mutual trade restrictions (which were lifted in July 
2017) on a range of products including a ban on wheat and maize imports were extremely 
harmful (TMEA, 2017c). Such bans are against not only EAC rules, their unpredictable nature 
catches private sector participants unawares, disrupts the trade chains, and participates in the 
creation of a generally unstable trade environment.  
National level initiatives (example of Sierra Leone12) 
Sierra Leone ranks 169th among 190 economies in terms of the ease of trading across borders, 
according to the World Bank's Doing Business 2017 report (World Bank, 2017a). Border taxation 
remains an important source of government revenue in Sierra Leone (WTO, 2017a) and tariffs 
are subject to frequent revisions, which are likely to impact the predictability of the tariff regimes 
(WTO, 2017a).  
Agriculture is one of the most important industries in Sierra Leone (e.g. agricultural sector’s 
contribution to GDP was 53.7% in 2015). Cocoa is Sierra Leone's major agricultural export, and 
rice and cassava being the main food crops. Rice is Sierra Leone's main staple food, currently 
produced mostly for the domestic market with only few marginal cross-border exports to Guinea 
and Liberia (WTO, 2017). 
In 2010, the government of Sierra Leone developed a National Export Strategy (NES) with a 
vision to "transform Sierra Leone into a flourishing country through a globally competitive export-
driven economy”. The NES has defined a framework for boosting agricultural exports to US$251 
million by 2015 (compared to US$33.1 million in 2009), (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2010). A 
                                                 
12 The example of Sierra Leone is chosen as, while the country was one of the lowest in ranking in terms of ease 
of trading, it demonstrates a willingness to integrate into the SSA market and adopts liberalising measures, while 
others (e.g. Nigeria) continue to add more protectionist measures. 
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unique feature of this initiative is that it is the fruit of constructive collaboration between the public 
and private sectors. 
More precisely, the NES promotes strong private sector participation and addresses issues of 
competitiveness through its strategic objectives as follows:  
• improving productivity and enhancing value addition; 
• diversifying the current export base; 
• strengthening the human and financial capacity of all stakeholders along the value chain 
Incentives are provided under various pieces of legislation. For instance, the Finance Act 2013 
allows 5 years' duty-free import of agricultural inputs (fertilisers; pesticides; insecticides; seeds 
and seedlings; hybrid tree seeds; seed animal for feeding; day-old-chicks; and animal semen). 
There is no recent assessment of the NES; the latest assessment was done by Belloc and Di 
Maio (2012). The authors conclude that: 
• export capabilities were improving, although the awareness of local producers about 
export opportunities remained limited; 
• physical infrastructure was still largely inadequate, and compliance with quality 
requirements and standards continued to be a major challenge;  
• limited access to credit restricted considerably the development of export-oriented 
activities;  
• land-tenure system, especially the application of the customary land system in rural 
areas, was an important barrier to the development of the agriculture sector. 
In order to reduce the State’s involvement in the private sector, in 2002, Sierra Leone established 
the National Commission for Privatisation (NCP) with a view to privatising public enterprises. In 
2013, the authorities dissolved the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board, a state-owned 
enterprise solely responsible for the purchase, export, and marketing of agricultural cash crop 
products including cocoa, coffee, cashew, palm oil, rice, and sorghum. The Board was replaced 
by a limited liability company, the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Company Limited. 
In addition, in 2011, Sierra Leone established a special economic zone (SEZ) with the goal of 
attracting foreign investors into the country by providing several incentives, including a perpetual 
duty exemption on imports and exports, a three-year corporate tax holiday, and on-site 
government services (such as business registration; customs inspection and immigration 
procedures). However, under the ECOWAS Protocol, exports by SEZ firms to other ECOWAS 
countries are not eligible for preferential treatment, i.e. they continue to be subject to customs 
duties at an applicable rate that does not profit to intra-regional trade.  
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